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Abstract 
 
By distinguishing between discretionary and non-discretionary fiscal policy, this paper 
analyses the stability of fiscal rules for EMU countries before and after the Maastricht 
Treaty. Using both Instrumental Variables and GMM techniques, it turns out that 
discretionary fiscal policy remains procyclical after 1992. This result contradicts the 
previous findings of Galí and Perotti (2003). It also appears that fiscal rules differ 
between large and small countries: especially large countries follow a procyclical 
discretionary policy. Furthermore, the paper shows that discretionary fiscal policy does 
exhibit different behaviour facing supply or demand constraints. The procyclical 
discretionary policy is followed mainly during upswings, when supply constraints are 
prevalent. Finally, there is no support for the presence of a ‘fatigue effect’ in fiscal 
discipline. 
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1 Introduction  
 
Fiscal arrangements, which have been settled during the European integration process, 
constitute undoubtedly the most criticized part of the European Monetary Union (EMU). 
Even if they aim at increasing real convergence among member countries, they are 
occasionally perceived among national politicians and European citizens as an 
unacceptable dictate from Brussels authorities, which removed the possibility of fiscal 
expansion in face of recessions. In other words, by imposing fiscal rules in the Maastricht 
Treaty or the Stability and Growth Pact, fiscal policy would have lost its counter-cyclical 
role and thus the stabilizing effect it used to play in the past. 
Empirical studies that have tried to find support for the changing cyclical 
behaviour of fiscal policy during the European integration process, failed to come to a 
clear-cut corroboration, and even endorse the fiscal ease introduced by the Maastricht 
Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact – see Wyplosz (2006) for a survey. In this 
respect, the paper of Galí and Perotti (2003) (GP hereafter) constitutes a widely cited 
example. GP distinguish systematically between discretionary and non discretionary 
fiscal policy in their analysis. In the first case the variable of interest is the structural 
deficit, i.e. corrected for cyclical fluctuations, and any change in the public deficit 
indicates discretionary policy. The non-discretionary part of the fiscal deficit then 
encompasses the automatic stabilizing effects due to business cycle fluctuations. For 
example, the public deficit tends to be automatically reduced during upward phases of the 
cycle, because of an increase in fiscal income.  
GP investigate the stability of both components of fiscal policy before and after 
the signature of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 through the estimation of a fiscal-rule 
equation for the period 1980 − 2002. As might be expected from the automatic stabilizer 
effects, non-discretionary fiscal policy clearly shows a counter-cyclical behaviour in the 
pre-Maastricht period, which even increases after the Maastricht Treaty. Concerning the 
discretionary part, GP find that fiscal policy was procyclical in the pre-Maastricht period 
but in the post-Maastricht period this changed into a- or counter-cyclical behaviour. 
Instead of supporting the weakness of fiscal policy in the constituted EMU, GP therefore 
conclude that the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact supported the 
implementation of fiscal policy, instead of being a restraint.  
 3 
This absence of a significant break in 1992 as well as the procyclical pattern of 
discretionary fiscal policy prior to Maastricht, but acyclical thereafter, has been 
confirmed by Wyplosz (2006, Table 2) using more recent data and similar estimation 
procedures. Von Hagen (2006, Table 6) finds that discretionary policy has remained 
procyclical after Maastricht, but this conclusion is subject to caution as it is based on 
pooled OLS estimation, which may be biased as we will argue below (in line with GP).
1
 
Fatás and Mihov (2003a) stress that the Stability and Growth Pact in its various guises 
has provided protection against the undesirable consequences of policy discretion by 
introducing constraints on deficit policy.
2
 They conclude that the Pact has indeed been 
successful in reducing deficit volatility, in particular for discretionary policy. However, 
they also observe a “fatigue in the process of fiscal adjustment. Once countries have 
moved into the safe area below the 3 per cent limit, the pressure to continue towards the 
goal of close to balance or surplus is much weaker …”.(p. 121) 
 
This paper extends the GP study to more recent years, since GP is based on data covering 
the period 1980 − 2002 issued mainly from OECD Economic outlook database.
3
 
Extending the sample for the period 2002−2004 provides additional information and 
removes the problem of data revision, which did affect the observations used by GP. 
Comparing the results of the estimation for the 1980 − 2002 and 1980 − 2004, it turns out 
that contrary to GP and Wyplosz (2006), discretionary fiscal policy is consistently 
procyclical over the sample. Furthermore, fiscal policy has not become less procyclical 
after Maastricht: adding the last two years indicates even greater procyclical behaviour of 
discretionary fiscal policy. Hence, the fiscal arrangements induced by EMU have in no 
case constituted an ease but instead have provided less room for effective discretionary 
fiscal policy. Contrary to GP, our conclusion supports the uneasy feeling among various 
European politicians. Concerning non-discretionary fiscal policy, the enlarged sample 
                                                 
1
  The same holds for the estimations by Fonseca Marinheira (2005).  
2
 An interesting observation by von Hagen (2006) is that elections do have an impact on the fiscal 
behaviour. 
3
 Several studies advocate the use of real-time data to judge on the pro- or counter cyclicality of fiscal 
policies, by using only information actually available to policymakers at the time they make their decisions 
– e.g. Forni and Momigliano (2004) and Golinelli and Momigliano (2006). However, data availability of 
real time data is limited. Moreover, the objective of this paper is to evaluate actual fiscal policy conducted 
by EMU governments and eventually governments are judged on their ex-post performance. 
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confirms the stabilizing role of automatic stabilizers, which play an increased role since 
1992 as predicted by economic theory (Wren-Lewis, 2000; Fatás and Mihov, 2003b). 
In our analysis we find strong indications of country heterogeneity. Following the 
literature we distinguish between different fiscal polices for large and small countries. 
We find that small countries have more effective discretionary fiscal policies, as 
expected. The large countries exhibit a different behaviour as they tend to support a 
procyclical discretionary fiscal policy, without any break in 1992. This small versus large 
country heterogeneity is not found in the case of non-discretionary fiscal policiy which is 
counter-cyclical whatever the country and the sample considered. 
To complement the analysis we also investigate the reaction of the discretionary 
and non-discretionary fiscal policy to supply and demand shocks separately. To this aim 
we use survey information on demand and supply constraints issued from the European 
Commission’s Business and Consumer Survey, EU (2006). It turns out that the 
procyclical bias of discretionary fiscal policy is most prevalent under supply constraints, 
i.e. during the upswing, which is consistent with our earlier findings towards debt 
reduction. Such a result constitutes a striking stylized fact. In line with Kostoris Padoa 
Schioppa (2006) we also expect a clear distinction between large and small countries in 
fiscal policy behaviour. Although we found some indications for the expected pattern – 
large countries being the main culprit – it turned out hard to obtain significant results. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we review the GP methodology 
and show that the results of the fiscal rule differ for an extended sample period. Since we 
also observe the presence of country heterogeneity, we further investigate the presence of 
heterogeneity by differentiating between large and small countries in Section 3 and show 
that country heterogeneity indeed plays a role. Finally, in Section 4 we investigate 
whether the observed differences in countries reactions can be explained by differences in 
demand and supply constraints – this turns out to be the case to a limited extent. 
However, we generally find an asymmetric reaction of discretionary fiscal policy to 
demand and supply constraints. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5. 
 5 
2 Have discretionary and non-discretionary fiscal policies changed since Maastricht? 
 
In line with GP most researchers that have investigated the behaviour of fiscal policy 
based their analysis on a fiscal rule. The simple link between a budget deficit (dt) and the 
output gap (gapt) can be specified as follows: 
 
dt = c + a1.gapt + εt,          (1) 
 
where εt is white noise. Nevertheless, this over-simplified fiscal rule suffers from several 
specification and estimation problems. First, it does not take into account the possible 
dynamics of the budget deficit. For instance, a country facing a huge deficit and a high 
debt level has less room for a new expansionary fiscal shock and will tend to be more 
restrictive for the coming fiscal exercise. As a consequence one might expect that the 
fiscal impulse at time t depends on the past public deficit (dt−1) and the past stock of debt 
(bt−1). Second, there is a clear simultaneity bias between public deficit (dt) and the output 
gap (gapt). For this reason, GP rightly reject the use of simple (pooled) OLS−estimator 
and apply an IV−estimator. However, Arrelano and Bover (1995) show that a GMM 
estimator based on orthogonal deviation might perform better than IV-estimator in the 
case of a dynamic panel model. Nevertheless, the relative properties of the IV and GMM 
estimator remain debatable in the econometric literature
4
, and thus we decide to report he 
results obtained by both methodologies. Third, the core of GP paper consists of a fixed-
effects panel data analysis where the fiscal rule is estimated for a group of countries i. 
Thus, our model roughly consists of the estimation of the following fiscal rule: 
 
di,t = ci + a1.Et−1(gapi,t) + a2.di,t−1 + a3.bi,t−1 + ui,t,      (2) 
 
                                                 
4
 Harris and Matyas (2004) compare the Arrelano-Bover (1995) approach to different IV specifications, 
showing that the respective properties of these estimators depend on several factors. In particular, they 
show by simulations that when sample size is finite, GMM may be biased as it considers large instrument 
matrices. 
 6 
where i refers to the country dimension and Et−1(gapi,t) is substituted to gapi,t. The 
instrument space consists of up to two lags of the dependent variable: di,t-2 and di,t-3.
5
 
Following GP we also add the lagged US output gap (gapUS,t-1) to the instrument space. 
The adequacy of the instruments is tested via the traditional Sargan test. To obtain robust 
standard errors the White period correction is applied.  
In order to directly compare our results to those of GP we also estimate the fiscal 
rule using a fixed effects Instrumental Variables (IV) estimator, where gapt is 
instrumented by the lagged output gap of the country itself, gapi,t-1, and the lagged US 
output gap, gapUS,t-1.  
To investigate whether a changing behaviour in the fiscal policy occurred after the 
Maastricht Treaty, the coefficients are allowed to take a different value in the periods 
before and after the Treaty, i.e. in the periods 1980 − 1991 and 1992 − 2004. Equation (2) 
then is rewritten as follows: 
 
di,t = ci
BM
 + ci
AM
 + a1
BM
.Et−1(gapi,t) + a1
AM
.Et−1(gapi,t) +  
a2
BM
.di,t−1 + a2
AM
.di,t−1 + a3
BM
.bi,t−1 + a3
AM
.bi,t−1 + ui,t,      (3) 
 
where a
BM
 and a
AM
 refer to the value of the coefficient during the pre and post-Maastricht 
periods, respectively. In the case of an unchanged behaviour of fiscal policy after the 
Treaty, it should be noticed that a1
BM
 = a1
AM
  can be tested via a simple F−test. A 
comparison of the values of the coefficients a1
BM
 and a1
AM
  would indicate if the ease of 
the fiscal policy has improved or not. In case the absolute value of a1 has increased, this 
indicates a stronger counter-cyclical behaviour when a1 < 0 or a stronger procyclical 
behaviour when a1 > 0. 
The proxy for fiscal policy is the budget deficit. As in GP, both the actual (dt) and 
the structural budget deficit (dt*) are considered in our study. The variable dt* indicates 
the discretionary changes in fiscal policies due to decision of fiscal authorities, whereas 
the variable dt – dt* represents the non-discretionary fiscal policy as it may be subject to 
changes that are not under the control of the fiscal authorities. An example for this 
“automatic stabilizing” effect, is the higher ease of non-discretionary fiscal policies 
                                                 
5
 Due to the nature of the panel, small N and large T, it is not feasible to use the entire instrument space 
composed of all lags of the dependent variable. 
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during upward movement of the business cycles.
6
 As activity is booming and the positive 
output gap increases, tax incomes automatically rise, reducing the budget deficit without 
any action of fiscal authorities. To remove business cycle movements and to have an 
adequate proxy of the discretionary action of the fiscal authorities, the OECD has 
constructed data on a structural public deficit.
7
 The discretionary and non-discretionary 
fiscal rules have the following forms: 
 
d*i,t = ci
BM
 + ci
AM
 + a1
BM
.Et−1(gapi,t) + a1
AM
.Et−1(gapi,t) +  
a2
BM
.d*i,t−1 + a2
AM
.d*i,t−1 + a3
BM
.bi,t−1 + a3
AM
.bi,t−1 + u*i,t,      (4) 
 
di,t – d*i,t = ci
BM
 + ci
AM
 + a1
BM
.Et−1(gapi,t) + a1
AM
.Et−1(gapi,t) +  
a2
BM
.(di,t−1 – d*i,-1t) + a2
AM
. (di,t−1 – d*i,-1t) + a3
BM
.bi,t−1 + a3
AM
.bi,t−1 + ui,t.  (5) 
 
A negative sign of a1 indicates a counter-cyclical policy, whereas a positive sign points 
towards a procyclical policy. 
We present the estimation results of the discretionary fiscal rule on the pre and 
post-Maastricht period for a set of 11 European countries in Tables (1) and (2), 
respectively, and of the non-discretionary fiscal rule in Table (3).
8
 Annual data over the 
period 1980 − 2004 are extracted from OECD (2006). The output gap (gapi,t) is defined 
as the relative  deviation of the gross domestic product from the potential output defined 
by the OECD.
9
 As in GP, the pre-Maastricht period corresponds to 1980 − 1991, whereas 
we consider two different post-Maastricht samples: the same as in GP, i.e. 1992 − 2002, 
and an extended one running from 1992 to 2004. We found that although the first sample 
is identical to the one used in GP, our more recent data are somewhat different because of 
the revision process: it takes more than one year before the OECD produces its definitive 
                                                 
6
 In line with the literature we concentrate on the primary government deficit, i.e. excluding interest 
payments on government debt. The motivation to do this is that the latter are neither discretionary, nor 
automatic stabilizers – whereas the discussion focuses on the interaction between discretionary policy and 
automatic stabilizers.  
7
 See the Appendix for data sources. 
8
 The countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain.  
9
 A quick inspection of the data shows that OECD potential output is similar to a trend obtained by 
applying a Hodrick-Prescott filter with standard λ parameters (λ = 400 for yearly data). 
 8 
data.
10
 We use four different estimations methods (Pooled Instrumental Variables, IV 
with fixed effects, IV with different fixed effects before and after Maastricht, and GMM) 
as well as four different sets of constraints on the fiscal rule (all the coefficients are free, 
no effect of the past public deficit on its actual level, a2 = 0, or/and no effect of the past 
stock of debt, a3 = 0). 
 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2] 
 
GP find a significant change in discretionary policy from “procyclical before [… to …] 
essentially acyclical after Maastricht.”(GP, p. 550). The comparable unrestricted IV-
estimates with fixed effects in Table (1) show no significant change. This indicates that 
the data revision had an impact on the estimation of the fiscal rule.
11
 On the other hand, 
the more efficient GMM-estimation results indicate a significant change, consistent with 
GP.  
Comparing the results of Tables (1) and (2) also suggests that discretionary fiscal 
policy has become more procyclical in recent years. That is, when we extend the 
estimation period to 2004, Table (2) shows quite different results for the GMM-estimates: 
the marked increase in the coefficient a1
AM
 after Maastricht signals that discretionary 
fiscal policy remains clearly procyclical after Maastricht – also the coefficient becomes 
marginally significant, whereas it was insignificant. Using the IV method a1
AM
 even 
becomes significantly positive when extending the estimation period.
 
The results of the 
restricted model lead to the same conclusion, except in the case where a2 =0, on which 
we comment below. 
A closer look at the estimated value of the coefficients a1
AM
 for the various IV-
estimates in Table (2) reveals some interesting results. First, without restrictions on the 
                                                 
10
 Even earlier data is subject to revisions in case previous data turns out to be unreliable or authorities 
change their statistical calculation methods. The former reason is most pronounced in the revision of 
Greece’s debt and deficit, whereas the latter is present in the revision of GDP figures. These revisions can 
be quite large, e.g. in the case of Greece the debt GDP/ratio for 2001 is 32 percentage points larger in 
OECD (2006) than in OECD (2002). However, also for Italy it is 12 percentage points higher, whereas it is 
7 percentage points lower for Spain, both for 2001. That earlier data is also revised is illustrated by the 
observation that the Netherlands’ debt/GDP ratio is 15 percentage points higher in 1982 in OECD (2006) 
than in OECD (2002). For most countries revisions took place, although different in magnitude. 
11
 Whereas we find for a1 = 0.221 (0.052) and 0.096 (0.076), before and after Maastricht respectively, with 
a p-value of 0.178 – cf Table 1 above, GP find a1 = 0.17 (0.05) and -0.08 (0.08), respectively, with a p-
value of 0.01 – cf their Table 3. 
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coefficients we find a marked decrease when we include a fixed country effect – compare 
the Pooled IV with the Fixed Effect IV estimation. Next, when we allow the fixed effect 
to be different before and after Maastricht, the country effect is reversed. This suggests 
that countries have reacted differently to a gap in their discretionary policy after the 
Treaty, even after controlling for the impact of past debt and deficits. We explore country 
heterogeneity in more detail in Section 3 below.  
As for the impact of past debt and deficits, ignoring the impact of past debt (a3 = 
0) leads to a marked increase in procyclicality of discretionary policy after the Treaty for 
both IV and GMM-estimates. Such changes are not observed before the Treaty for IV, 
whereas a decrease is visible for GMM. Ignoring the problem of misspecification, which 
might generate severe statistical distortions at the origin of this result; these observations 
suggest that the impact of debt on discretionary policy has increased after Maastricht: 
debt awareness did lead to a more prudent discretionary fiscal policy. This notion is 
consistent with the findings for GMM-estimates that the negative impact of debt on the 
deficit is higher after Maastricht, although not significantly so. For the IV estimations, a 
smaller impact is found if a different pre and post Treaty country fixed effect is used, 
whereas a higher impact is found if only a single country fixed effect is used. This 
suggests that (some) countries experienced increased debt awareness in their 
discretionary fiscal policy after the Treaty. 
Excluding the lagged deficit from the fiscal rule leads to a dramatic increase in the 
procyclicality before the Treaty and a stark decrease thereafter. It is not clear to which 
extent these results have any meaning due to the presence of severe autocorrelation in the 
residuals. But whatever the case, both GMM and IV-estimates show similar changes in 
the estimated value of a1
AM
 when the impact of the lagged deficit is ignored. This could 
indicate the importance of past budget deficits for the efficiency of the discretionary 
policy: Ceteris paribus, an equilibrated budget deficit would ease the improvement of an 
active discretionary fiscal policy. Excluding both debt and lagged deficit from the fiscal 
rule result in unclear outcomes, moreover severe biases are present due misspecification 
and serial correlation. Additionally the Sargan test rejects the adequacy of the instrument 
space. 
In general, there appears to be much country heterogeneity and both GMM and 
fixed effects IV deal with this differently. Although general trends are confirmed by both 
 10 
methods, for robustness we will present both GMM and IV estimates (GP methodology) 
in our further investigations. 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
From Table (3) one sees that the results for non-discretionary fiscal policy are quite clear: 
Whatever the estimation method, a significant increase in the counter-cyclical behaviour 
of this type of fiscal policy after Maastricht is found – since similar results are found 
when we estimate for the period until 2002, we do not present these results separately. 
This confirms the finding of GP that automatic stabilizers took a more important place 
after the fiscal arrangements induced by the EMU. It is also interesting to observe that 
neither country specific effects nor restrictions on the impact of deficits and debts had a 
large impact. This is consistent with the interpretation of non-discretionary policy as truly 
representing automatic stabilizers. 
 Finally we have also reproduced all estimations presented in Tables 2 and 3 for 
the period 1980 – 2006, using the most recent data, which will certainly be revised for the 
years 2005-6 (for that reason they are not presented separately). The new estimations 
show the same tendencies as reported above for the discretionary deficit, and the impact 
of past debt has become even stronger. For the non-discretionary deficit all coefficients 
are almost identical to the results reported in Table 3. 
 
While the findings on non-discretionary policy are quite robust and consistent with prior 
notions, the findings on discretionary policy are more volatile both with respect to the 
estimation period and with respect to the restrictions imposed. However, two general 
observations can be made. First, a changing behaviour of the discretionary fiscal policy 
with respect to the output gap before and after Maastricht is rejected. That is, contrary to 
the findings of GP we find that discretionary fiscal policy has remained procyclical. 
Moreover, we have strong indications that discretionary fiscal policy has become more 
procyclical in recent years. A second observation is that we found, again contrary to the 
findings of GP, that past debt (or deficits) had a stronger impact on discretionary fiscal 
policy after Maastricht. This leads us to conclude that after Maastricht increased debt 
awareness has led to much more prudent discretionary policy, in particular in recent 
 11 
years. Thus discretionary policy partly neutralized the impact of the automatic stabilizers, 
in order to keep the deficit under control. We elaborate on this point in the next section 
and in our concluding remarks. 
 A final observation is that we have strong indications that countries reacted 
differently to the Maastricht Treaty in the implementation of their fiscal policy, even after 
controlling for past debts and deficits.  
  
3 Have discretionary and non-discretionary fiscal policies changed since Maastricht: A 
large vs. small country dimension  
 
We have argued above that among the 11 European countries under scope, some 
countries exhibit heterogeneous behaviour. This might imply that our panel analysis leads 
to an average of country-specific fiscal rules which have little in common. To investigate 
this possibility we estimate the fiscal rule for each individual country.
12
 To keep the 
endogeneity bias under control, we use the IV-method with dummies before and after 
Maastricht to estimate the individual equations. 
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
Table (4) summarizes the results of the estimation of these individual fiscal rules. It turns 
out that the output gap only has a significant effect on discretionary policy after 
Maastricht for 5 countries: France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Portugal, which all have a 
consistently procyclical behaviour. Austria, Belgium, and Finland show a counter-
cyclical discretionary fiscal policy, although the impact of the output gap does not differ 
significantly from zero.
13
 A closer look at the data shows that for both Finland and 
Portugal the output gap behaves opposite to that of the other European countries, hence 
Portugal and Finland were probably hit by asymmetric shocks. With respect to Greece, 
                                                 
12
 Note that estimation of the fiscal rule for individual countries leads to a small sample bias, i.e. 24 
observations for the whole sample. Nevertheless, it gives an indication of the implementation of the fiscal 
rule at the country level. Following GP we do not distinguish between before and after Maastricht for the 
coefficients of lagged debt and deficit, in order to limit the number of parameters to be estimated. 
13
 Not published results show the discretionary fiscal policy is more procyclical for most countries when 
including the years 2003 and 2004 in the post-Maastricht sample, supporting our conclusion in Section 2 of 
a stronger destabilizing role of the discretionary fiscal policy. 
 12 
the data revision did lead to some quite serious changes to correct for wrong information 
which Greece presented when entering the EMU. 
The non-discretionary fiscal policy exhibits a homogenous picture for all 
countries: it is significantly counter-cyclical as can be seen from the last two columns of 
Table (4). This result stresses again the importance of automatic stabilizers in the fiscal 
stabilization policy and corroborates our conclusion in Section 2. However, from Table 
(4) one also sees that for none of the countries the impact of the output gap on the non-
discretionary deficit is significantly different before and after the Maastricht treaty. This 
finding is consistent with the IV estimates reported in Table (2) above. 
 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
The observed procyclical behaviour of France, Germany and Italy on the one hand and 
the outlier positions of Finland, Greece and Portugal on the other, indicate the direction 
of a more systematic investigation of country heterogeneity in discretionary policy. 
Moreover, employing both the GMM estimator and the fixed effect IV estimator enables 
us to check the robustness of the estimations and allows for heterogeneity in the 
explanatory variables before and after Maastricht.  
First we show in panel A of Table (5) that excluding the outliers from the 
estimation results indeed affects the estimation results for the EMU-11. One sees that 
leaving out the two countries with asymmetric shocks leads to significant procyclical 
behaviour for the remaining countries after Maastricht. However, when only Greece is 
excluded the picture changes quite strongly. The procyclical behaviour of discretionary 
policy before Maastricht changes towards an acyclical stance after Maastricht. This 
finding, which is in line with GP, still hides significant country specific heterogeneity. 
The observed procyclical behaviour of France, Germany and Italy, warrants 
taking the large countries in the EU from our sample as a group (France, Germany, Italy 
and Spain) whose behaviour is compared to the small countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Ireland and the Netherlands). Various studies point to the possibility that small countries 
will stick much closer to the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact than large countries – 
e.g. de Haan et al. (2003) and von Hagen (2003); see Buti and Pench (2004) and Kostoris 
Padoa Schioppa (2006) for a survey.  
 13 
Observe from panel B in Table (5) that the large countries had a significant 
procyclical discretionary fiscal policy before Maastricht, which became more 
significantly procyclical thereafter, whereas the small countries had a significant 
procyclical policy before Maastricht, but acyclical thereafter. This indeed is consistent 
with the notion that small countries will stick closer the MT-rules, but does not explain 
why the large countries should follow a procyclical policy. 
A possible explanation for the latter observation is given in von Hagen (2006), 
who distinguishes between countries following two different institutional approaches: the 
delegation approach and the contractual approach, respectively – this is further elaborated 
in Hallerberg et al. (2007). The large countries are characterised by the delegation 
approach and “the reforms of the budget process strengthening delegation in these 
countries during the 1990’s should have a long-run benefit in terms of higher fiscal 
discipline” (Hallerberg et al., 2007: 356).
14
 The latter observation is consistent with our 
finding of a procyclical discretionary policy for these countries. 
 A quite different interpretation of the situation is provided by Kostoris Padoa 
Schioppa (2006), who emphasises that it is important to distinguish between demand and 
supply shocks to understand this phenomenon.  
 
4 Have discretionary and non-discretionary fiscal policies changed since Maastricht: 
Decomposing supply and demand constraints  
 
In search for a different impact of the output gap on the deficit for various countries we 
look at the different components of the output gap. Business cycle fluctuations can either 
take their origins in constraints affecting the supply or the demand side. In our view an 
asymmetric pattern of fiscal policy can be expected to both types of constraints. For 
instance Calmfors et al. (2003, p.50) state that, in the short run “there is no reason… to 
believe that the automatic stabilisers give an optimal degree of stabilisation… [On the 
contrary] if there are permanent supply shocks, the automatic stabilisers tend to prolong 
the adjustment process and cause budget effects that must ultimately be eliminated 
through discretionary action”. See also Beetsma and Jensen (2004) who emphasize that 
the effectiveness of a common fiscal policy rule for several countries with imperfectly 
                                                 
14
 The reason is that delegation countries give the minister of finance a lot of discretionary power which is 
easily abused 
 
leading to a political business cycle.
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correlated supply shocks depends on the extent to which products are close substitutes. A 
different argument is brought forward by Kostoris Padoa Schioppa (2006), who in line 
with Uhlig (2003), emphasizes that demand shocks affect inflation indirectly through the 
output gap, while supply shocks affect inflation directly. This implies that the European 
Central Bank will react directly to supply shocks (in particular occurring in large 
countries) and indirectly to demand shocks. Since the EMU countries will take the 
reaction by the ECB into account when deciding on fiscal policy, demand and supply 
shocks will have an asymmetric impact, in particular in large countries. 
The demand and supply indicators are constructed from disaggregated data of the 
European Commission’s Business and Consumer Survey, EU (2006). We focus on 
Question 8 in the Industry / Business Climate Indicator (BCI) part, which asks companies 
to record the most important factor limiting their production. There are six possible 
answers (financial, demand, labour, equipment, other or none), which are reported in the 
dataset by a percentage of total firms selecting this choice. We identify the answers 
‘demand’ and ‘financial’ with demand constraints and ‘labour’ and ‘equipment’ with 
supply constraints.
15
 Hence, it is possible to construct two indicators by simply adding up 
the shares of the firms answering ‘demand’ and ‘financial’ to define the demand 
constraint (Dt) and of the shares answering ‘labour’ and ‘equipment’ for the supply 
constraint (St) – the shares answering  ‘none’ and ‘other’ form the last category, ‘no 
constraint’. A higher value for each constraint indicates that the constraint is more 
prevalent. Demand and supply variables have a quarterly frequency, but have been 
annualized using an arithmetic average, and cover the period 1985 to 2004 for all 
countries of our sample, except Austria and Finland for which no data were available.
16
 
Demand and supply variables are presented in Figure 1. 
 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
From Figure 1 one sees that demand and supply constraints typically follow the 
cycle in a counter-cyclical and procyclical way, respectively. As a consequence demand 
                                                 
15
  The inclusion of financial constraints under demand constraints follows from the notion that credit 
rationing constrains demand (Van der Ploeg, 2005).  
16
 The data on Austria starts only in 1996:Q1 and on Finland in 1995:Q4. Portugal and Spain are included 
although data are missing for 1985 and 1986. 
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and supply constraints co-move strongly. Another observation is that there is a difference 
in the shares of firms reporting demand and supply constraints over countries. For 
instance, in Germany on average 40 per cent of the firms indicate having demand 
constraints, while only 5 percent on average reports supply constraints. In France the 
corresponding shares are 25 and 30 percent, respectively. The differences following from 
different reporting behaviour across countries will not affect our estimation results, 
however, since these will be included in the fixed effects. 
 
The (discretionary or non-discretionary) fiscal rule can be expressed in terms of demand 
(Dt) and supply (St) constraints, instead of the output gap variable (gapt). This is 
expressed in equation (5):  
 
a1
X
.Et−1(gapi,t) = a1D
X
.Et−1(Di,t) + a1S
X
.Et−1(Si,t)  X =AM, BM   (5) 
 
As a consequence the equations to be estimated follow from substituting equation (5) in 
equations (3) and (4), respectively.
17
 
The estimation results are presented for discretionary and non-discretionary 
policy in panel A of Tables (6) and (7), respectively. To allow for a fair comparison with 
previous results, we present in both tables in the first line also the results of estimating 
the output gap (gapt). Finally, the inspection of Figure 1 indicates us that supply and 
demand variables co-move strongly with each other, albeit inversely.
18
 It is thus likely 
that estimating an equation containing both of them will lead to multicollinearity bias. 
Hence, we also estimate equations (3) and (4) separately with the demand and the supply 
constraint alone. These results are presented in panel B of both Tables. Finally we 
included in panel C the results obtained when leaving out debt from the estimation results 
of panel B (imposing a3 = 0). 
Comparing Table (6) with Table (2) shows that leaving out Austria and Finland 
results in an increase in the estimated impact of the output gap on discretionary policy for 
                                                 
17
 The category ‘no constraint’, which makes up for the full one hundred per cent of the output gap then is a 
default and included in the constant term. This allows us to ignore the large differences in reported ‘no 
constraints’ over countries – the category ‘other’ is negligibly small. Kostoris Padoa Schioppa (2006) 
overcomes this problem by looking at the ratio Dt/St, but this ratio shows a highly volatile pattern, since Dt 
and St usually move in opposite directions. 
18
 Fixed effect estimation of demand on supply constraints yields a highly significant coefficient of -1. 
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the post-Maastricht period. Since the shorter sample period, starting in 1985 instead of 
1980, can hardly be held be held responsible for differences in the post-Maastricht 
results, the smaller sample of countries should be held responsible. However, the results 
for non-discretionary policy barely change when leaving out Austria and Finland as can 
be seen from Tables (3) and (7). These observations emphasize the heterogeneity of 
country reactions in case of discretionary policy which we also found in the previous 
section. 
 
[Insert Tables 6 and 7] 
 
When further comparing the estimation results, one should realize that a demand 
constraint should be associated with a negative output gap, and a supply constraint with a 
positive output gap.
19
 Therefore one might expect the same sign for a1 and a1S, and an 
opposite sign for a1D.  
Looking first at the case of non-discretionary policy panel A in Table (7) shows 
that the impact of supply constraints is consistently negative whenever significant. Also 
both GMM and IV indicate that supply constraints have a significantly stronger impact 
after Maastricht. However, the impact of demand constraints is less clear: the IV-
estimation results are consistent with predictions, i.e. it has a positive impact, whereas 
GMM yields insignificant results.  
When estimating the effects separately, panel B of Table (7) shows that in the 
case of non-discretionary policy all results are consistent with expectations – the impact 
of demand and supply constraints is consistently positive and negative, respectively, for 
both GMM and IV. These results are confirmed and even stronger when we exclude the 
impact of debt, as can be seen from panel C. When excluding the impact of debt, non-
discretionary policy reacts consistently positive to demand shocks, with a stronger 
reaction after Maastricht.  
Since panel A shows no significant impact of demand shocks, this points to a 
hampering impact of debt awareness on the working of the automatic stabilisers during 
downturns. Moreover, in both panels A and B the supply constraints have a significantly 
                                                 
19
  This is confirmed by fixed effect estimation of the output gap on demand and supply constraints, which 
yields highly significant results – the results are obtainable on request from the authors. 
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stronger impact after Maastricht, suggesting that the automatic stabilisers are much more 
active in reducing the deficit after Maastricht – both compared to the pre-Maastricht 
period and to the impact of demand constraints. This also points to a tendency of a 
stricter budget policy – in particular after Maastricht.  
 
Turning to discretionary policy the estimation results in panel A of Table (6) indicate that 
using GMM and IV one finds consistently that discretionary policy does not seem to react 
to supply and demand shocks: no significant impact is found – only a weak significant 
result for supply constraints can be observed in case of IV. However, both methods show 
that the output gap has a strong procyclical impact on the deficit.  
This latter observation is confirmed in panel B of Table (6), showing the impact 
of both demand and supply shocks when estimated separately. The impact of both types 
of shocks is significant according to the IV-estimations. For both types of shocks the 
impact turns out to be much stronger after Maastricht. Panel C confirms and strengthens 
these findings, although excluding the impact of debt does not affect these results 
strongly. Finally, one sees that in the period after Maastricht supply shocks have a much 
stronger impact than demand shocks, as is the case with non-discretionary policy.
20
 Our 
estimations are consistent with Fonseca Marinheira (2005) who finds an asymmetric 
impact of procyclical policy and concludes: “Thus, in general, discretionary fiscal policy 
is procyclical in upswings and counter-cyclical in downswings.”(p.9) 
 
[Insert Tables 8 and 9] 
 
When considering country heterogeneity along the line of section 3 – see Table (5) – we 
find no significant impact of demand or supply constraints on the discretionary budget 
deficit when using GMM for the full sample of countries – cf. Panel A of Tables (8) and 
(9). The IV results show, however, a highly significant procyclical impact of supply 
constraints after Maastricht. 
When focussing on large countries instead – cf. panel B of Tables (8) and (9) – neither 
demand shocks nor supply shocks are significant after Maastricht. However, the GMM-
                                                 
20
 The fixed effects estimation of the output gap on demand and supply constraints shows no stronger 
impact of the supply constraints on the output gap compared to the impact of demand constraints. 
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results indicate a significant decrease in the impact of demand constraints compared to 
the period before Maastricht and an almost significant increase in the impact of supply 
constraints. The results for the small countries show no clear pattern. This picture is 
stronger for the IV-results, which show that the highly significant procyclical impact of 
supply constraints after Maastricht found for all countries is due to the highly significant 
impact of supply constraints for the large countries. 
 
In conclusion, the decomposition of the output gap in demand and supply constraints 
illuminates that in general the EMU9 countries have reacted in an asymmetric way to 
demand and supply shocks. The estimation results indicate that non-discretionary policy 
was more focussed on reducing the deficit after Maastricht: the counter-cyclical reaction 
to supply constraints was stronger, both compared to the pre-Maastricht period and to the 
impact of demand constraints. Similar results were found for the procyclical discretionary 
policy. Again supply shocks were found to have a much stronger impact than demand 
shocks in the period after Maastricht. 
The results also shed more light on country heterogeneity in discretionary policy. 
Consistent with the results from the previous section we find that the procyclical 
discretionary policy is mainly present in large countries. But the results of this section 
show that procyclical policy only occurs during upswings, when supply constraints are 
more binding. 
 
5 Conclusion  
 
In evaluating the impact of the Maastricht Treaty on fiscal policy in the EMU countries, 
Galí and Perotti (2003) find that the automatic stabilisers are more effective in counter-
cyclical stabilisation after the implementation of the Treaty, while the procyclical stance 
of discretionary fiscal policy before Maastricht turns to an acyclical stance thereafter. 
From these findings Galí and Perotti conclude that the fiscal rules implied by Maastricht 
(and by the Stability and Growth Pact) do not imply an unnecessary and harmful straight 
jacket for fiscal policy in the EMU countries. 
 Using an extended sample size and revised data, this paper puts some shadow on 
this optimistic finding of Galí and Perotti. We show that the procyclical behaviour of the 
 19 
fiscal discretionary policy has not disappeared with the Maatricht Treaty, but instead it 
persisted and was even amplified in recent years. Such a result stresses that the fiscal 
arrangements that followed the Maastricht Treaty indeed tied the hands of European 
governments in their implementation of stabilizing discretionary fiscal policy.     
This conclusion corroborates the result of Fatás and Mihov (2003a) who attribute 
it to a ‘fatigue effect’. They illustrate this by presenting two trends over the period 1991 – 
2001. In their Figure 4 they portray the average value of change in the cyclically adjusted 
budget of the Euro countries. The decline of this value over the period 1991 – 1999 
indicates “a trend towards smaller changes in discretionary policy. …[However], since 
1999, this measure of discretionary fiscal policy is picking up again. In other words, in 
2000 and 2001 governments deviated more from their cyclically adjusted budget 
positions than in previous years.” (122) – this is indicative of the fatigue effect: “Once 
countries have moved into the safe area below the 3 percent limit, the pressure to 
continue towards the goal of close to balance or surplus is much weaker and it shows in 
the data.”(121) Similar observations are made by Fatás and Mihov (2003a) from their 
Figure 8, in which they present the standard deviation of change in the cyclically adjusted 
budget of the Euro countries. They find that the dispersion after a decreasing trend until 
1999 also has higher values in 2000 and 2001. 
 
[Insert Figures 2 and 3] 
 
We reproduce both series for our sample for the period 1980 – 2006 in Figures 2 and 3.
21
 
The decline Fatás and Mihov (2003a) report for the 1990s is also clearly visible in our 
data. However, this decline starts in the 1980s as can be seen from our data, which 
contradicts Fatás and Mihov’s focus on the 1990s and the Maastricht Treaty. Moreover, 
Figure 2 clearly illustrates the procyclical nature of discretionary policy, which we find 
consistently in our earlier analysis – compare for instance the impact of the recessions in 
1987, 1991 and 2001. The latter recession also illustrates that the interpretation by Fatás 
and Mihov (2003a) of the increased discretionary budget deficit in 2000 and 2001 is not 
due to a fatigue effect, but rather due to the procyclical nature of discretionary policy, in 
                                                 
21
 One should realize that Fatás and Mihov (2003a) use a different method to identify discretionary deficits 
than the OECD, based on the estimated residual of a government spending equation – see Fatás and Mihov 
(2003b).  
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particular during upswings: when the business cycle picks up again, the discretionary 
deficit decreases. Figure 3 clearly illustrates the country heterogeneity we report above, 
the larger spread during recessions illustrates the different reactions of large and small 
member states discussed in Section 3 above. 
The economic stance appears as a key factor for the characterization of fiscal policy. In a 
recent paper Manasse (2005) distinguishes between on the one hand “very good” and 
“very bad” economic times, and on the other hand “intermediate states”. He then derives 
a simple model where limits on deficit output ratios lead to procyclical policies only in 
intermediate states, and to countercyclical policies in the other cases. Empirical 
investigations are now necessary to assess this idea and these will constitute a promising 
future research field. It will nevertheless be necessary to overcome some technical 
problems, in particular those associated with the low number of observations (only few 
business cycles have been observed since 1992).  
 
 21 
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Data Appendix 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 79 (June 2006) 
- Primary Government Balance, Cyclically Adjusted, 
- Primary Government Balance, 
- Output Gap, 
- Gross Government Debt. 
 
Note: For Germany until 1990 the series for West-Germany has been used and from 1991 
onwards data for Germany. 
 
Data is available from 1979-2007, but for some countries the data is extended backward: 
- Primary government balance Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain (1979) 
- Gross Government debt Ireland (1979-1997), Italy (1979-1994), Portugal (1979-
1994) and Spain (1979-1989) 
 
The extension for gross government debt has been performed by taking the ratio of old 
data versus new for the first three years for which both are available and taking the 
average of the ratios. Since these do not differ much, the data is extended back by 
multiplying the old with the respective ratio. The "old" data are the data used by Galí and 
Perotti (2003). Primary government balance is estimated in a similar fashion for the 
single year 1979. 
 
The cyclical part of deficit is calculated by converting the primary government balance as 
a percentage of potential GDP by: Primary gov't balance*(100-output gap)/100 and 
subtracting the Cyclically adjusted primary government balance from it. The differences 
are relatively small. 
 
A detailed description of the data can be found in the OECD's Economic Outlook 
Database Inventory: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/59/37380381.pdf (EO79 August 
2006 version). 
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country a1
BM
a1
AM
test a1
BM
=a1
AM
a1
BM
a1
AM
test a1
BM
=a1
AM
AUT 0.042 -0.172 -0.428*** -0.487***
(0.183) (0.324) 0.552 (0.080) (0.094) 0.305
BEL 0.356 -0.482 -0.617*** -0.754***
(0.251) (0.694) 0.253 (0.066) (0.110) 0.233
DEU 0.450*** 0.474** -0.517*** -0.781***
(0.103) (0.207) 0.918 (0.104) (0.190) 0.142
ESP 0.097 0.017 -0.460*** -0.482***
(0.117) (0.215) 0.762 (0.102) (0.079) 0.648
FIN 0.162 -0.282 -0.417*** -0.620***
(0.362) (0.206) 0.321 (0.096) (0.092) 0.001
FRA 0.175 0.484* -0.408*** -0.456***
(0.123) (0.245) 0.291 (0.031) (0.032) 0.153
GRC 0.088 1.173*** -0.345*** -0.352***
(0.377) (0.352) 0.059 (0.043) (0.036) 0.853
IRE 0.748** 0.669 -0.450*** -0.346***
(0.341) (0.452) 0.800 (0.041) (0.033) 0.042
ITA 0.373* 0.567** -0.428*** -0.483***
(0.207) (0.256) 0.556 (0.059) (0.069) 0.349
NLD 0.309 0.212 -0.484*** -0.470***
(0.179) (0.252) 0.781 (0.045) (0.046) 0.806
PRT 0.371*** 0.319** -0.309*** -0.427***
(0.075) (0.148) 0.739 (0.017) (0.029) 0.000
Table 4: EMU Individual Fiscal Rule 1980-2004
Discretionary Non-discretionary
 
Note: This table refers to the discretionary and non-discretionary fiscal rules d*i,t = ci
BM
 + ci
AM
 + 
a1
BM
.Et−1(gapi,t) + a1
AM
.Et−1(gapi,t) + a2
BM
.d*i,t−1 + a2
AM
.d*i,t−1 + a3
BM
.bi,t−1 + a3
AM
.bi,t−1 + ui,t  and (di,t - d*i,t) 
= ci
BM
 + ci
AM
 + a1
BM
.Et−1(gapi,t) + a1
AM
.Et−1(gapi,t) + a2
BM
. (di,t - d*i,t) + a2
AM
.(di,t - d*i,t) + a3
BM
.bi,t−1 + 
a3
AM
.bi,t−1 + ui,t. Coefficients are reported as well as standard deviation between brackets. *, ** and *** 
imply significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. Equality between a1
BM
 and a1
AM
 
is tested by a standard F-test, whose p-value is indicated. The output gap is instrumented in the IV 
estimator by including the one-year lagged US output gap. 
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Countries a1
BM
a1
AM
test a1
BM
=a1
AM
Sargan a1
BM
a1
AM
test a1
BM
=a1
AM
EMU11 0.214*** 0.111* 0.221*** 0.152**
(0.026) (0.066) 0.026 0.092 (0.051) (0.065) 0.414
EMU11 (excl. FIN & PRT) 0.217*** 0.183** 0.222*** 0.389***
(0.029) (0.078) 0.615 0.040 (0.060) (0.089) 0.120
EMU11 (excl. GRC) 0.194*** 0.067 0.246*** 0.074
(0.028) (0.076) 0.040 0.521 (0.048) (0.067) 0.038
EMU11 (excl. FIN/GRC/PRT) 0.194*** 0.144* 0.254*** 0.290***
(0.038) (0.078) 0.530 0.253 (0.054) (0.095) 0.746
DEU/ESP/FRA/ITA 0.204*** 0.284** 0.254*** 0.410***
(0.069) (0.109) 0.325 0.272 (0.071) (0.122) 0.272
AUT/BEL/FIN/GRC/IRE/NLD/PRT 0.222*** 0.070 0.210*** 0.102
(0.029) (0.088) 0.018 0.443 (0.070) (0.080) 0.312
AUT/BEL/IRE/NLD 0.265*** 0.053* 0.260*** 0.208
(0.058) (0.028) 0.000 0.437 (0.093) (0.145) 0.767
Table 5: Country heterogeneity (output gap EMU11, 1980-2004)
Panel B: Large vs. Small countries
Panel A: EMU11 and outliers
GMM IV
 
Note: This table refers to the discretionary fiscal rule d*i,t = ci
BM
 + ci
AM
 + a1
BM
.Et−1(gapi,t) + 
a1
AM
.Et−1(gapi,t) + a2
BM
.d*i,t−1 + a2
AM
.d*i,t−1 + a3
BM
.bi,t−1 + a3
AM
.bi,t−1 + ui,t. Coefficients are reported as well 
as standard deviation between brackets. *, ** and *** imply significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance level respectively. Equality between a1
BM
 and a1
AM
 is tested by a standard F-test, whose p-
value is indicated. For the GMM estimator, the instrument space is constituted of the second and third lag 
of the dependent variable and the one-year lagged US output gap. The adequacy of this instrument space is 
tested with the Sargan test. The output gap is instrumented in the IV estimator by including the one-year 
lagged US output gap. 
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a1
BM
a1
AM
test a1
BM
=a1
AM
Sargan a1
BM
a1
AM
test a1
BM
=a1
AM
p-value p-value p-value
Output gap 0.189** 0.172** 0.203*** 0.360***
(0.078) (0.071) 0.883 0.183 (0.076) (0.075) 0.143
Demand -0.020 -0.008 0.022 -0.003
(0.029) (0.038) 0.404 0.246 (0.041) (0.056) 0.721
Supply 0.025 0.069 0.126 0.215*
(0.063) (0.084) 0.442 0.246 (0.096) (0.110) 0.546
Demand -0.031 -0.023 -0.021 -0.101***
(0.021) (0.019) 0.508 0.275 (0.019) (0.033) 0.037
Supply 0.052 0.092* 0.069 0.220***
(0.040) (0.048) 0.484 0.347 (0.048) (0.065) 0.066
Output gap 0.167*** 0.289*** 0.159** 0.362***
(0.057) (0.078) 0.234 0.072 (0.072) (0.068) 0.041
Demand -0.027** -0.040*** -0.013 -0.103***
(0.012) (0.013) 0.008 0.079 (0.019) (0.031) 0.016
Supply 0.098** 0.115*** 0.055 0.252***
(0.049) (0.041) 0.763 0.440 (0.051) (0.069) 0.023
Panel B: Either demand or supply in (3)
Panel C: Either demand or supply in (3) with a3=0
Table 6: Discretionary fiscal policy, EMU9 1986-2004
IVGMM
Panel A: Both demand and supply in (3)
 
Note: This table refers to the discretionary fiscal rule d*i,t = ci
BM
 + ci
AM
 + a1
BM
.Et−1(gapi,t) + 
a1
AM
.Et−1(gapi,t) + a2
BM
.d*i,t−1 + a2
AM
.d*i,t−1 + a3
BM
.bi,t−1 + a3
AM
.bi,t−1 + ui,t. Coefficients are reported as well 
as standard deviation between brackets. *, ** and *** imply significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance level respectively. Equality between a1
BM
 and a1
AM
 is tested by a standard F-test, whose p-
value is indicated. For the GMM estimator, the instrument space is constituted of the second and third lag 
of the dependent variable and the one-year lagged US output gap. The adequacy of this instrument space is 
tested with the Sargan test. The output gap is instrumented in the IV estimator by including the one-year 
lagged US output gap. 
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a1
BM
a1
AM
test a1
BM
=a1
AM
Sargan a1
BM
a1
AM
test a1
BM
=a1
AM
p-value p-value p-value
Output gap -0.339*** -0.494*** -0.298*** -0.521***
(0.034) (0.039) 0.001 0.143 (0.048) (0.022) 0.000
Demand 0.010 0.015 0.030 0.093**
(0.017) (0.020) 0.851 0.216 (0.020) (0.038) 0.142
Supply -0.101 -0.185** 0.008 -0.170**
(0.062) (0.078) 0.008 0.216 (0.051) (0.074) 0.049
Demand 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.029* 0.176***
(0.013) (0.012) 0.763 0.000 (0.016) (0.029) 0.000
Supply -0.126 -0.201** -0.061 -0.327***
(0.078) (0.083) 0.006 0.500 (0.038) (0.049) 0.000
Output gap -0.341*** -0.482*** -0.297*** -0.512***
(0.031) (0.036) 0.001 0.097 (0.043) (0.020) 0.000
Demand 0.044*** 0.057*** 0.030* 0.195***
(0.013) (0.011) 0.002 0.000 (0.018) (0.033) 0.000
Supply -0.128** -0.204** -0.062 -0.370***
(0.061) (0.082) 0.004 0.094 (0.044) (0.056) 0.000
Panel B: Either demand or supply in (4)
Panel C: Either demand or supply in (4) with a3=0
Table 7: Non-discretionary fiscal policy, EMU9 1986-2004
GMM IV
Panel A: Both demand and supply in (4)
 
Note: This table refers to the non-discretionary fiscal rule di,t - d*i,t = ci
BM
 + ci
AM
 + a1
BM
.Et−1(gapi,t) + 
a1
AM
.Et−1(gapi,t) + a2
BM
. (di,t - d*i,t) + a2
AM
.(di,t - d*i,t) + a3
BM
.bi,t−1 + a3
AM
.bi,t−1 + ui,t. Coefficients are 
reported as well as standard deviation between brackets. *, ** and *** imply significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% significance level respectively. Equality between a1
BM
 and a1
AM
 is tested by a standard F-test, 
whose p-value is indicated. For the GMM estimator, the instrument space is constituted of the second and 
third lag of the dependent variable and the one-year lagged US output gap. The adequacy of this instrument 
space is tested with the Sargan test. The output gap is instrumented in the IV estimator by including the 
one-year lagged US output gap. 
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Countries a1
BM
a1
AM
test a1
BM
=a1
AM
Sargan a1
BM
a1
AM
test a1
BM
=a1
AM
EMU9 -0.031 -0.023 -0.004 -0.005
(0.021) (0.019) 0.508 0.275 (0.008) (0.006) 0.971
EMU9 (excl. PRT) -0.040* -0.035* -0.005 -0.006
(0.021) (0.019) 0.719 0.523 (0.008) (0.006) 0.893
EMU9 (excl. GRC) -0.022 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001
(0.015) (0.012) 0.119 0.189 (0.007) (0.006) 0.628
EMU9 (excl. GRC&PRT) -0.032* -0.017 -0.005 -0.002
(0.017) (0.011) 0.157 0.336 (0.007) (0.006) 0.743
DEU/ESP/FRA/ITA -0.029*** -0.010 -0.003 0.002
(0.009) (0.015) 0.015 0.522 (0.007) (0.007) 0.595
BEL/GRC/IRE/NLD/PRT -0.000 -0.011 -0.023 -0.014
(0.027) (0.022) 0.129 0.181 (0.017) (0.012) 0.664
BEL/IRE/NLD -0.006 0.001 -0.031** -0.015
(0.014) (0.015) 0.641 0.246 (0.014) (0.012) 0.369
Panel B: Large vs. Small countries
Table 8: Discretionary fiscal rule, 1985-2004, Demand constraints
GMM IV
Panel A: EMU9 and outliers
 
 
Countries a1
BM
a1
AM
test a1
BM
=a1
AM
Sargan a1
BM
a1
AM
test a1
BM
=a1
AM
EMU9 0.052 0.092* 0,019 0.067***
(0.040) (0.048) 0.484 0.347 (0.015) (0.023) 0.078
EMU9 (excl. PRT) 0.068 0.071 0.020 0.072**
(0.049) (0.057) 0.963 0.551 (0.016) (0.028) 0.101
EMU9 (excl. GRC) 0.039 0.092* 0.017 0.084***
(0.029) (0.054) 0.344 0.408 (0.013) (0.021) 0.008
EMU9 (excl. GRC&PRT) 0.048 0.069 0.016 0.090***
(0.034) (0.067) 0.760 0.368 (0.013) (0.025) 0.011
DEU/ESP/FRA/ITA 0.013 0.074 0.006 0.069***
(0.018) (0.049) 0.070 0.313 (0.013) (0.023) 0.021
BEL/GRC/IRE/NLD/PRT -0.111* -0.015 0.022 0.054
(0.059) (0.068) 0.009 0.179 (0.041) (0.038) 0.576
BEL/IRE/NLD 0.108 -0.130 0.013 0.184*
(0.140) (0.146) 0.197 0.358 (0.137) (0.103) 0.322
Panel B: Large vs. Small countries
GMM IV
Table 9: Discretionary fiscal rule, 1985-2004, Supply constraints
Panel A: EMU9 and outliers
 
Note: Tables 8 and 9 refer to the discretionary fiscal rule d*i,t = ci
BM
 + ci
AM
 + a1
BM
.Et−1(gapi,t) + 
a1
AM
.Et−1(gapi,t) + a2
BM
.d*i,t−1 + a2
AM
.d*i,t−1 + a3
BM
.bi,t−1 + a3
AM
.bi,t−1 + ui,t. Coefficients are reported as well 
as standard deviation between brackets. *, ** and *** imply significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance level respectively. Equality between a1
BM
 and a1
AM
 is tested by a standard F-test, whose p-
value is indicated. For the GMM estimator, the instrument space is constituted of the second and third lag 
of the dependent variable and the one-year lagged US output gap. The adequacy of this instrument space is 
tested with the Sargan test. The output gap is instrumented in the IV estimator by including the one-year 
lagged US output gap. For the GMM specification BEL/IRE/NLD the lagged US gap is excluded from the 
instrument space. The output gap is instrumented in the IV estimator by including the one-year lagged US 
output gap. 
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Figure 1: Supply and Demand Indicators
Left and right axis represent the percentage of firms indicating they face demand or supply constraints, respectively.
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 Figure 2: Average Absolute Value of Change in Cyclically Adjusted Budget 
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Figure 3: Standard Deviation of Change in Cyclycally Adjusted Budget
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